In an integrated global financial system, a sovereign default raises concerns of financial contagion to other countries. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model featuring a network of international borrowing and lending. In the model, the network structure of borrowing-lending relationships arises endogenously and results in the propagation of financial shocks across countries. We estimate the model using data on foreign claims among a network of 20 countries over six years. Simulating counterfactual experiments from the estimated model, we find a non-trivial role for financial contagion. The default of a sovereign in the network has a noticeable effect on the borrowing costs and default probabilities of other network members. *
Introduction
The recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe has renewed concerns of financial contagion. In an integrated global financial system, where countries are simultaneously borrowing and lending from one another, the default of one country can directly result in the subsequent default of its lenders. This linkage introduces the possibility of financial contagion, whereby the default of one sovereign borrower can impair the financial position of its counterparties, leading to a clustering of defaults. Such a crisis can have damaging effects on the real economic activity of both the defaulting and non-defaulting countries.
In this paper we develop and estimate an equilibrium model of international borrowing and lending in a network of large economies. In the model, countries finance a portion of their capital investment by borrowing from other countries. These bilateral lendingborrowing relationships between countries comprise an endogenous network where countries' financial conditions are interconnected. In such a network, contagion risk arises naturally as a shock to one sovereign can propagate through the network to generate a sovereign debt crisis affecting multiple countries in the network.
Using data on foreign claims from the Bank for International Settlements, we estimate the model for a network of 20 countries. In contrast to most of the existing literature on contagion that takes financial networks as exogenous, the network structure in our model arises endogenously as an equilibrium outcome. The lending-borrowing network evolves over time in response to local economic shocks and the global supply and demand for capital. With the estimated model parameters, we also conduct a series of counterfactual experiments. These experiments provide us with an estimate of the degree of contagion risk present in the existing network of international borrowing and lending. In particular, we do this by simulating the default of a given country and examining the impact on the default probabilities of other countries in the network. As a starting point, we consider a global economy with risk-neutral agents in which countries' output shocks are uncorrelated. Simulating counterfactual defaults in the estimated network, we observe contagion effects following the default of a sovereign in the network. The fact that the estimated model is able to produce these effects under this simplified environment suggests a significant role for contagion in sovereign debt markets, even in the absence of an explicit amplification mechanism.
Our approach makes possible further analyses that will be added in an upcoming version that extends this preliminary draft. First, we will simulate outcomes under counterfactual network structures. That is, we will simulate the estimated model under alternative network topologies and examine how the degree of contagion risk varies. Second, we will simulate longer-run effects on investment and output, by solving for the complete lending-borrowing network and projecting its evolution over time. In addition, if needed we can extend the current empirical specification to allow for risk aversion and other nonlinearities by adopting a simulation-based estimator.
Our paper is related to two existing strands of literature. The first is a relatively new literature that studies financial networks and contagion. The second studies sovereign debt, default, and credit risk, typically in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy.
The role of networks in financial contagion has been the subject of a growing literature that mainly began with the theoretical work of Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) . Both papers model an interbank market where liquidity shocks from consumers in different locations are the reason for interbank deposits and transfers. They consider the possible contagion of insolvency throughout the system if one bank fails, and both models indicate that more connected networks are more resilient against this contagion.
Allen and Babus (2009) provide a survey of the subsequent theoretical and empirical literature. As they note, several authors have found evidence of contagion in interbank networks, although the network structures are taken as exogenous in these analyses.
Two recent papers attempt to endogenize the network structure, with certain restrictions. Babus (2009) models a network of interbank deposits among banks in one region with common liquidity shocks, given pre-existing links with banks in another region that has the opposite liquidity shocks. Assuming each bank is linked to every bank in the opposite region, a network forms in the home region that minimizes the risk of contagion. Cohen-Cole, Patacchini, and Zenou (2011) include a simple model of network formation in an empirical study of interbank loans. They assume that banks move individually in an exogenous sequence, and must either add or remove one link to maximize a myopic change in payoffs. 1 To draw a distinction with these papers, our model endogenizes the complete network of international loans and treats this network in a unified fashion. Agents move simultaneously, and there is no imposition of myopic beliefs. 2
Relatively little work has considered the role of financial networks in spillovers from a sovereign debt crisis, or other international contexts for financial contagion. 3 The most relevant to us is Bolton and Jeanne (2011) , who develop a model that links government 1 The use of an exogenous sequence of moves, and the myopic beliefs, are similar to Christakis et al. (2010) and Mele (2010) . These assumptions function as equilibrium selection rules, with unclear consequences.
2 Dynamic considerations do not impact behavior in our model, but this arises naturally from the primitives.
3 Allen and Gale (2000) note that the different regions in their model could be interpreted as countries.
debt to the financial sector (where it is used as collateral for interbank loans). Sovereign risk affects the reserves of domestic and foreign banks that hold this debt. With a simple, two-country network, they show that banks diversify their debt portfolios, and so a sovereign default in one country reduces liquidity, and hence investment and output, in both countries.
Empirically, a handful of recent papers provide evidence on the international transmission of financial shocks during the recent financial crisis. De Haas and Van Horen (2011) and Giannetti and Laeven (2011) examine international lending by large banks, and find that those with greater losses or less access to credit made greater reductions in their cross-border lending. Similarly, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) and Popov and Udell (2010) find that the supply of loans fell in emerging markets due to reductions in cross-border lending from international banks and local lending from banks with foreign parents, as well as reductions in local lending by domestic banks affected by the international interbank market.
Our paper is also related to a literature that studies sovereign borrowing and lending.
This strand of literature builds on the seminal work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) to study sovereign debt and default in a dynamic general equilibrium model. These papers study sovereign borrowing with endogenous default in dynamic general equilibrium models with incomplete markets. Arellano (2008) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the network model of international borrowing and lending. We discuss our empirical approach to estimating the model in Section 3 and the data used in the estimation in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the results from the estimated model. Finally, in Section 6 we use the estimated model to simulate counterfactual sovereign defaults and examine the contagion effects of these shocks propagating through the network of borrowing and lending relationships.
Model
We develop a representative agent model of macroeconomic investment and production, international borrowing and lending, and solvency. Our model shares many features with the existing literature, particularly Allen and Gale (2000) , Bolton and Jeanne (2011) , and Arellano (2008) . However unlike some previous work on financial contagion or sovereign debt crises, there is no separate banking sector or government sector. Instead, the agents in our model function jointly as consumers, producers, and lenders.
The global economy consists of countries i = 1, . . . , N , which are of similar size. 4 Each country has a continuum of households, and these households have access to "projects" that can convert an investment of the consumption good in one period into output in the next period. Time is measured in discrete periods (t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ), with no terminal date. Given an investment I in period t, a project yields f (I) in period t + 1, with f > 0 and f < 0.
There is no other storage technology.
Households can make loans to invest in projects at other households, both in their own country and in other countries. However they cannot invest in their own projects. This restriction generates lending and links financial activity to aggregate production in a relatively simple macroeconomic model. 5 Similar restrictions appear in other work, such as Bolton and Jeanne (2011) where only some bankers have access to a project. A loan, l, made in one period is paid back in the next period for a total return of rl, unless the recipient defaults in which case there is some exogenous recovery rate (described later). Loans are made from one particular household in country i to another household in country j (perhaps the same country). However, we will restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, so we can usually describe behavior in terms of one representative household in each country. In that case a loan from country i to country j in period t is denoted l t ij .
There is a cost of making loans to each country, given by a function c. It depends on the total loans made by an individual household (h) to households in country j, l t hij , and the per capita amount of loans made by all households in the same country to country j in the previous period:l t−1 ij . The cost is increasing and convex in the individual household's current loans (l t hij ), which represents the difficulty of finding a good projects to invest in.
However there is a negative cross-partial with the per capita amount of loans made in the previous period (l t−1 ij ). This captures the idea that it is easier to find good projects in some country if more households in your own country have invested there before. We use the per capita amount rather than the household's own lagged amount for convenience, because it avoids a dynamic incentive to invest in order to reduce future costs. Still this assumption can be motivated, in part, because good projects will appear at different households over time, and so there may be a benefit in learning about these projects from other investors in your country. To summarize, the cost of making loans to country j for some household h
Each period a household has revenues from its latest project and the return on its loans.
The total investment in the project at the representative household in country i in period t − 1 is I t−1 i = j l t−1 ji . Given this investment, the project yields f (I t−1 i ) in period t. The loan repayment the household receives from country j in period t is denoted y t ij , which equals r t−1 j l t−1 ij unless there is a default in country j. Total revenue from loan repayments is j y t ij . There is also an exogenous revenue shock each period, X t i , which is the same for all households in a country. This represents economy-wide productivity shocks, government fiscal shocks, etc., and is subtracted from the other revenue. Thus the available revenue for the representative household in country i in period t is f
In addition, the household has obligations in the amount of r t−1 i I t−1 i , to pay back the loans it received in the previous period.
If revenues exceed obligations, the representative household in country i is solvent (s t i = 1) and can use its remaining money to make loans. In this case the budget constraint is
The household defaults (s t i = 0) iff its debt is greater than its revenues:
A default only lasts for the current period. When in default, a household cannot make loans or receive loans to invest in its project, and its consumption is zero. For simplicity we assume that its creditors are paid back an exogenous proportion of their loans, δ ∈ [0, 1], so that they receive δr t−1 i l t−1 ji if country i defaults. We set δ = 0.4. Finally, to account for whether a country is solvent or not, the loan repayments are defined as y t ij = r t−1
Solution
A symmetric equilibrium is assumed. Given interest rates r t j , j = 1 . . . N , households in country i choose loan amounts (l t ij , j = 1 . . . N ) and a level of debt and investment (I t i ) to maximize consumption each period:
be the equilibrium probability that the households in country i will be solvent in the next period. Because the individual households are small, they cannot affect default probabilities with their investment decisions, and so these probabilities are taken as given as well. Expected consumption in the next period is
as consumption is zero when s i,t+1 = 0. The optimization problem in period t is thus
(This includes a subjective discount rate ρ < 1 so that the objective is well defined.) To solve this problem we only need to consider consumption in periods t and t + 1. This is because an individual household cannot affect the per capita loan amounts,l t ij , that affect costs and hence lending in future periods. As a result, the optimization problem is in essence static.
The FOCs for loans involve the probability of default in the next period, both for the lender and the debtor, because a loan is fully repaid and the lender benefits from this money only if both are solvent. This can be seen from the expected benefit of a loan to country j,
which is
= 1] is the probability that the households in country j are solvent conditional on those in i being solvent. Thus the marginal benefit is ρp t+1
while the marginal cost of a loan is 1 + c 1 (l t ij ,l t−1 ij ), and so the FOC is
For loans within the same country, the expression is simpler because p t+1 i|i = 1 (intuitively, either all households will default or none will). So the expected benefit of a domestic loan is
The solvency probabilities, p t+1 i , satisfy a system of equations:
where F X is the CDF of X and F Y is the joint distribution of (y t+1 ij ). The latter is derived
As a result, computing (3) involves solving for s conditional on X and integrating over the joint distribution of X.
Finally, the FOC for the borrowing and investment amount is
Then the equilibrium is completed with one other aggregate condition: investment equals the sum of loans, I t i = j l t ji .
Empirical Approach
For the preliminary analysis, we focus on the estimation of equation (3) which gives the solvency probabilities, using data on CDS prices, aggregate investment, interest rates, and foreign claims. With this we can simulate the short-term consequences of a default and of alternative network structures. The further analysis will add equation (2), the FOC for cross-country loans, in order to recover the remaining structural parameters. With the model fully estimated we will then be able to simulate the long-term consequences on investment, output, and risk.
To derive the probabilities in (3) we must consider solutions to (4). First we show that solutions exist where within-country loans (l t ii ) can drop out of this equation. Substituting in for −r t i I t i and y t+1 ij , we have
Let V t i represent all the terms within the brackets above, except for −r t i l t ii and +r t
In this case, the country would default if its own households fail to pay each other back, but would be solvent if they do pay each other back. If we select the equilibrium in which the households pay each other back, this means the terms −r t i l t ii and +r t i l t ii [δ + (1 − δ)s t+1 i ]
will always cancel and can be removed from the expression. To gain further tractability, we impose an additional equilibrium selection rule. Suppose that, given realizations of X t+1 , there are two solutions for s t+1 i and s t+1 j : either both countries default or both are solvent.
In what follows, we always select the equilibrium where i and j remain solvent and pay each other back. We apply this selection rule in determining p t+1 j|i , p t+1 k|i,j and so on. In principle these expressions can be derived all the way to p t+1 z|−z , which is the probability that country z will be solvent conditional on all the other countries being solvent. However in the implementation we truncate the expansion used to compute p t+1 i at three steps (i.e., up to p t+1 m|i,j,k ). This is a reasonable approximation because each new step is discounted by 1−δ σ , so further steps would have little impact on the value of p t+1 i .
We assume that the X i shocks are independent across countries are independent across countries and follow a conditional normal distribution. To account for hetereogeneity across sovereigns, we assume that the standard deviation of a country's shock scales in the size of its economy, Z i . Specifically, each country's shock, X i , is conditionally normally distributed as X t+1
Additionally, we allow for an intercept term equal to β 0 Z i . In what follows, we set Z i to be a country's (seasonally adjusted) GDP in the fourth quarter of 2004, the quarter immediately preceding the beginning of our sample period. To complete the specification of equation (3), we use a quadratic for the production function: f (I t i ) = α 1 I t i + α 2 (I t i ) 2 . This yields the following specification for a country's solvency probability:
where 1 is an indicator function and X t is the vector of all X t j (i inclusive). We obtain similar expressions for p t+1 j|i and the two further steps in the expansion.
If we suppose that there is only simple measurement error between the empirical default probabilities from transformed CDS spreads in the data and the "true" beliefs about solvency probabilities from the model, the observed values can be written as p t+1
We can then recover the parameters α, β, and σ by minimizing the squared loss between the observed and predicted values:
For the preliminary analysis we use this as the objective function. 6
Data
In this section we discuss the data used in estimating our structural model of an international borrowing and lending network. We begin by collecting data on international financial relationships provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and supplement these data with macroeconomic and financial variables from the OECD and IMF. Using these data, we construct a network of lending relationships consisting of 20 countries for the period from 2005Q1 to 2011Q3. Table I lists the countries included in our sample. In addition to the lending relationships, we collect data on countries' GDP, investment, yields on government-issued long-term bonds, and prices on sovereign credit default swaps.
The GDP and investment series for each country come from the OECD's Quarterly National Accounts dataset. Specifically, we use quarterly GDP growth rates and gross fixed capital formation. The gross fixed capital formation is measured in fixed PPP and both series are seasonally adjusted. Additionally, we collect yields on 10-year government bonds from the OECD's Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics database.
In In From these data, we construct the variables used in equation (6) as follows. Using the 5-year sovereign CDS spreads and the U.S. Treasury yield curve, we compute the time series of quarterly solvency probabilities for each sovereign. 8 For the gross returns on loans, r t i , we directly use the yields on 10-year government bonds. The measure of baseline output, Z i , is a country's annual GDP in 2004, and investment, I t i , is quarterly gross fixed capital formation. 9 For the revenue shock, X t i , we use the quarterly GDP growth rate multiplied by the baseline output. In addition the growth rate is first detrended by subtracting the average quarterly growth rate from 1995 to 2004. For the amount of loans from one country to another, l t ij , we directly use the BIS data on foreign claims on an ultimate risk basis. While these claims mostly have maturities longer than three months, the existence of secondary markets means that claims do not have to be held until maturity. Lastly, as noted before, we fix the exogenous recovery rate at δ = 0.4.
Results
The parameters recovered by our estimation procedure are listed in Table VI . The marginal effect of international debts on a sovereign's solvency probability is significant. A difference of one unit in the normalized debt load is large, meaning a difference in total foreign claims on a country equal to its annual GDP in 2004 (i.e., j =i l t ji r t i /Z i = 1). However the data span this amount; for example, over our time period the total foreign claims on Austria, Ireland, and Portugal all range by more than their GDP. At a point in time, the range of the normalized debt load across countries is also greater than one in most quarters. The size of this marginal effect is large relative to the average default probability: a one unit increase in the debt load raises the quarterly default probability by approximately 105 bps. Alternatively, a net debt increase of 85%, which is equal to one standard deviation of the normalized distribution, amounts to a decrease of 89 bps in the sovereign's solvency probability in the next quarter. In Table VII , we present additional results on the distribution of solvency probabilities as well as the fit of the model predicted probabilities with what is observed in the data for our 396 observations. Panel A presents quartiles as well as the 5th and 95th percentile of the distribution of quarterly solvency probabilities. The first column reports the empirical solvency probabilities computed from the sovereign CDS spreads and the second column presents the counterpart values predicted by the model under the estimated parameter values given in Table VI . Panel B reports the correlation of the observed and model predicted solvency probabilities as well as the sum of squared residuals. These values are 0.741 and 0.081, respectively.
Simulations
Using the estimated version of equation (6) we can simulate the short-run effect of a nationwide default on the solvency of other countries. The equation gives the probability that each country will be solvent in the next quarter (i.e., period t + 1). To simulate the default of some country j in that period, we replace the computed conditional probabilities p t+1 j|i with zero (and do the same for p t+1 j|... in the second and third steps of the expansion). This makes it so that the other countries receive no endogenous payments from country j, although they still benefit from the exogenous recovery rate for a portion of their claims. The difference between the original predicted solvency probabilities (p t+1 i ) and the new predictions that result from this change (p t+1 i ) shows the increase in the default probabilities of the other countries in period t + 1. This is a measure of the immediate contagious effect of a default in one country.
We do this exercise separately for a default of Italy and a default of Spain using the last period of our data (2011Q3), which means the simulated default occurs in 2011Q4. Table   VIII shows the total claims each country had on these two countries in 2011Q3, normalized by the lender's GDP in 2004. The largest lenders to Spain, relative to their own economies, were the Netherlands and Portugal, both of which had claims worth over 10% of their annual output. To Italy, the largest relative lender was France with claims worth over 20% of its annual output.
The results of these simulations are in Tables IX and X. We focus our analysis on the effect that a default by Spain or Italy would have on the other European sovereigns in our sample. In the first column of each table, we present the absolute change, measured in basis points, a sovereign's default probability in the next quarter resulting from the default of Italy (Table IX) or Spain (Table X) . This change is measured relative to the model predicted baseline in a case where the country does not default. The absolute magnitude of the baseline quarterly default probability, even at the end of 2011, is relatively small for most sovereigns.
Therefore, the relative change in a sovereign's default probability is also of interest as a small absolute change in the default probability can still represent a significant relative change. To this end, the second column of each table reports the relative increase, measured in percent, in a sovereign's one quarter default probability resulting from the default of Italy or Spain.
For both simulate default events, we observe significant heterogeneity in the response of other sovereigns. Additionally, we see that a given country can have a significantly different response to the two default events. For example, Portugal's response to a default by Spain is about an order of magnitude larger than its response to the default of Italy. Conversely, we see that France would be more affected by Italy's default than the default of Spain. This table presents the results of the simulation described in Section 6. Baseline default probabilities come from the model as originally estimated. Simulated default probabilities come from the model when we make the probability of repayment from Spain be zero. The relative change is the difference divided by the baseline, which is the same for either the one-year or five-year probabilities. See the text for further details.
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